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GROUND WATER RIGHTS AND DEPLETION
DEDUCTION
SHO SATO*
In the early part of 1963, a federal district court decided that a
user of ground water for irrigation, in computing his federal in-
come tax, is entitled to a cost depletion deduction when ground
water is being "mined."' On June 7, 1965, the Fifth Circuit, in
United States v. Shurbet, affirmed the decision.2 This was evidently
a test case, and it has resolved the issue for the irrigators in the
Southern High Plains in situations similar to that in Shurbet. The
case merits careful attention, however. The issue in Shurbet is novel,
and in view of the overdraft conditions in many groundwater
basins today, the impact of the decision should be explored.
The purpose of this discussion is not to reargue the case, but to
analyze it to determine its value as precedent. At the outset, it
should be made clear that the only issue before the court was
whether the taxpayer was entitled to take a cost depletion deduction.
There was no question as to percentage depletion; the statute ex-
plicitly excludes water from percentage depletion treatment.3
In Shurbet, the taxpayer was pumping water primarily for farm-
ing use from the groundwater basin in the Southern High Plains in
Texas. The findings of the lower court,4 which were not disturbed
on appeal,' were: (1) the basin was recharged, if at all, only by
precipitation on the Southern High Plains because the bed of the
*Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. This article has been pre-
pared for the forthcoming publication of Water Law of the United States by the Allen
Smith Company.
1. Shurbet v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9528 (N.D. Tex. 1963), noted in
42 Texas L. Rev. 260 (1963).
2. 347 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1965). The Internal Revenue Service has stated that it
will follow this decision and "cost depletion will be allowed to taxpayers in the South-
ern High Plains under acts similar to those" in this case. Rev. Rul. 65-296, 1965 Int.
Rev. Bull. No. 50, at 30.
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §613(b) (6) (A). Section 613(b) specifies the percent-
age depletion allowable with respect to the enumerated minerals, and in paragraph
(6) a percentage depletion of 15% is given to "all other minerals." But the paragraph
provides that the phrase "all other minerals" does not include "(A) soil, sod, dirt, turf,
water, or mosses; or (B) minerals from sea water, the air, or similar inexhaustible
sources." Had the phrase "similar inexhaustible sources" followed "water," one might
make the argument that Congress denied a percentage depletion only when the supply
was inexhaustible. However, the structure of the exclusions makes clear that "water"
of any kind is excluded.
4. Shurbet v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. j 9528 (N.D. Tex. 1963).
5. Because the court of appeals accepted the findings of the district court, 347 F.2d
at 104-06, the facts are taken from the opinion of the district court.
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basin was higher than the surrounding area; (2) although precipita-
tion averaged 20 inches annually, more than 99% was lost by
evaporation and transpiration because of the coincidence of the
rainfall with the irrigation season, high temperature, and low
humidity; (3) the percolation rate of surface water into the basin
was extremely slow; (4) the annual recharge averaged between
3/20 to 1/2 inch per year, and (5) the water table had been declin-
ing due to an increased number of wells. The court found that the
ground water in the basin was being "mined" because the water was
being taken from storage and that continual pumping will eventually
exhaust the supply or will prevent future extraction when pumping
becomes uneconomical.
The cost depletion was computed in the following manner: the
cost of the water right was determined by comparing the cost of the
land which included the right to ground water purchased by the tax-
payer compared with the cost of similar land without such right, the
difference being the cost of the water right; the measure of the de-
duction was a ratio of the current decrease in the water table over
the thickness of the zone of saturation at the time of purchase as
applied to the cost of the water right.
The policy arguments for allowing a deduction under these cir-
cumstances seem clear. If the water supply is not inexhaustible, the
withdrawal of water from such supply depletes the capital to that
extent, like the mining of any ore depletes the ore deposit. The in-
come derived from the use of such resource cannot be accurately
measured unless a deduction is permitted for a wasting of the capital
used in the production of such income. If the rationale behind cost
depletion allowances and depreciation deductions is generally sound,
there is no reason to deny a deduction for the mining of ground
water.6
Whether the statute sustains such a policy was the issue in Shur-
bet. Section 611 provides: "In the case of mines, oil and gas wells,
6. The taxpayer sought to amend his complaint to plead the following alternate
grounds for refund: (1) depreciation; (2) amortization; (3) business expense, or (4)
cost of the goods sold. The district court denied the amendment since the grounds were
not mentioned in the claim for refund. Brief for Appellee, pp. 101-09. The Government
acknowledged that original capital investment may be recovered by the various methods
mentioned by the taxpayer but maintained that the propriety of any such method was
not before the court. Brief for Appellant, pp. 17-21. Compare the characterization in
Flona Corp. v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 354 (S.D. Fla. 1963) (the vacation of
judgment in Flona is noted in the Shurbet case), where deduction for cost of goods sold
was permitted for sod originally purchased with the land, and then sold; and a cost
depletion was permitted for removal of top soil.
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other natural deposits, and timber, there shall be allowed as a deduc-
tion in computing taxable income a reasonable allowance for deple-
tion . . . according to the peculiar conditions in each case .... "-,
The Government argued principally that water was not a "nat-
ural deposit" within the meaning of section 611 because that term
referred to minerals which were severed and sold.' According to the
Government, the types of minerals which were given the depletion
allowance were the same under the cost and percentage depletion
provisions.9 Because Congress had expressly excluded water from
percentage depletion provisions, 0 it necessarily follows that water
was not subject to cost depletion allowance either.
The taxpayer, on the other hand, contended: (1) water in the
Ogallala Formation was a "natural deposit";" (2) cost depletion
was independent of percentage depletion, 2 and (3) there is no re-
quirement of sale of the natural deposit in order to obtain a cost
depletion deduction.'
Both sides engaged in a detailed analysis of legislative history but
emerged with opposite conclusions. The taxpayer was able to point
to the existing regulation which defines "minerals" to include "all
other natural metallic and nonmetallic deposits, except minerals de-
rived from the sea water, the air, or from similar inexhaustible
sources."'14 The regulation continues, "it [the term 'minerals'] in-
cludes but is not limited to all of the minerals and other natural de-
posits subject to depletion based upon a percentage of gross income
from the property under section 613 and the regulations there-
under." In addition, the taxpayer cited rulings that severance and
sale of soil in place, although not given a percentage depletion, was
subject to cost depletion. 15
7. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 611(a).
8. Brief for Appellant, pp. 22-42.
9. Brief for Appellant, pp. 45-49.
10. Ibid.
11. Brief for Appellee, pp. 40-41.
12. Brief for Appellee, pp. 82-99.
13. Brief for Appellee, pp. 42-81.
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(d) (5) (1960). See Brief for Appellee. pp. 98-99.
15. Rev. Rul. 78, 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 18; Rev. Rul. 55-11, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 212. See
Brief for Appellee, p. 97. These rulings pertained to pre-1954 provisions. But if the
Government is correct in its contention that only "minerals" given a percentage deple-
tion qualify for cost depletion under the 1954 Code, severance and sale of soil would
no longer be given a cost depletion since soil is expressly excluded from percentage
depletion. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 613(b) (6) (A). The Government, however, con-
ceded that soil was an exception to the above rule according to administrative inter-
pretation, and that Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(d) (5) (1960) was drafted to reflect this sole
exception. Reply Brief for Appellant, pp. 4-5.
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The court disposed of the issue as follows:
In cost depletion, we do not agree with the government that 'natural
deposits' have been equated to 'mineral deposits' from which income
is derived through severance and sale of the mineral. The language
of the cost depletion provisions, sections 611 and 612 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, do not convey any such meaning, and it
seems to us inconsistent with the purpose and rationale of cost deple-
tion.1 6
The court also pointed to the aforementioned regulation and a case' 7
dealing with cost depletion for topsoil as refuting the Govern-
ment's argument based on coextensiveness of cost and percentage
depletion.
The method of computing the depletion allowance adopted by the
court is not without analogy. Generally, cost depletion is computed
by the ratio of the appropriate units of the minerals extracted dur-
ing the year to the total units extractable at the beginning of the
year. 8 Where the units are difficult to measure, such as in certain
extraction of natural gas, the regulation provides that the cost de-
pletion may be determined on the basis of the decrease in rock
pressure.' 9 In the light of this authority it would appear that the
decline in the water table is a reasonable method of computation.
In appraising the effect of Shurbet, however, one should remem-
ber the concluding words of the opinion: "[O]ur decision is limited
to the allowance of cost depletion for ground water extracted from
the Ogallala water reservoir of the Southern High Plains, 'accord-
ing to the peculiar conditions in each case,' sec. 611 of the 1954
Internal Revenue Code."2 °
In view of this cautionary statement, one should note that the
district court found that the decline in the water table in the tax-
payer's wells had been caused by the amount of withdrawal by the
taxpayer.
21
It is conceivable, however, that with the increasing number of
wells in the basin the total extraction will increase and the decline
16. 347 F.2d at 108.
17. Flona Corp. v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 354 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a) (1) 1960).
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a) (4) (1960).
20. 347 F.2d at 109.
21. Findings 5.18(e) and 7.2(e), 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. E 9528. This computation was
evidently made by matching the extraction by the taxpayer against the yield from
the amount of decline in the zone of saturation.
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in the groundwater table under the taxpayer's land will be ac-
celerated by others. In Texas the absolute ownership doctrine has
been adopted with respect to percolating ground water and under
that doctrine the owner of land overlying a groundwater basin
may extract as much as he needs without regard to injury to other
overlying owners.22 Allocation based on equitable or correlative
share is not recognized under this doctrine; the overlying owner has
no assurance regarding any given quantity of water in the future.
Even the irrigable acreage overlying the basin will not serve as a
practical guide for future maximum annual extraction since water
can be exported from the basin for beneficial uses, including munic-
ipal uses.
2
.
If the decline in the water table in the taxpayer's wells is attrib-
utable in part to extraction by others, how is the cost depletion to be
computed? 24 One possible method is to determine the average an-
nual irrigation requirement of the taxpayer for the future and
estimate the useful life of the basin to the taxpayer. The product
of these two figures will indicate the total number of acre-feet of
water which the taxpayer expects to extract. Thus, the unit cost can
be determined by dividing the cost basis by the total acre-feet ex-
pected to be pumped by the taxpayer. The cost depletion is the prod-
uct of the unit cost multiplied by the current consumption. 25 The
disadvantage to this computation, although it attempts to reflect the
individual's situation, is that the estimates are rough at best.
Another method calls for a constant readjustment of the unit cost
22. City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 798
(1955) ; Houston & T.C. Ry. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279 (1904). The reasonable
use theory similarly permits extraction without regard to adverse consequences to other
overlying owners, except that, unlike the absolute ownership doctrine, the water must
be used on the land overlying the basin. Bristor v. Cheatham, 75 Ariz. 227, 255 P.2d 173
(1953).
23. City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, supra note 22.
24. The Government may take the position in the future that a taxpayer should
be allowed a depletion allowance only for the depletion caused by the taxpayer. See
Reply Brief of Appellant, pp. 22-23. In fact, the Government may assume a more
stringent attitude in refusing a depletion allowance to the extent that water applied
by the taxpayer is not consumed by the plant and is therefore not used to produce
income. Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 14-. The latter position seems unreasonable since
evaporation and runoff "waste" appears economically inevitable in field irrigation.
Would evapo-transpiration also be denied depletion allowance? To the extent that
water was used for personal purposes, depletion allowance should be denied. This issue
was raised by the Government, Reply Brief for Appellant, p. 14, but the court ignored
it.
25. To the extent that there is return, water measurement by withdrawal would not
be accurate. Thus, consumption measures the exhaustion.
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to the taxpayer to the extent that others have caused a decline in the
water table. Perhaps this method is theoretically consistent with
the cost depletion, but the unit cost will increase to the extent that
decline in the water table is accelerated by others.
A measurement dependent upon the water table offers several
different methods of determining unit cost. The unit cost may be
determined by dividing the cost of the water right by the zone
of saturation at the time of purchase. This unit cost may be multi-
plied by the decline in the water table caused by the taxpayer. This
method of computation will not permit the taxpayer to recover
through cost depletion the cost attributable to the water right
initially purchased, and the unrecovered basis would have to be ac-
counted for at the time of sale or exchange of property. 26 More-
over, this method also involves the difficulty of determining how
much of the decline is due to the taxpayer's withdrawal and how
much to that of others.
Finally, the amount of cost depletion might be computed by taking
the same unit cost and multiplying that figure by the annual decline
in the water table by whomever caused. There is much to be said for
this method because of the ease of administration, but it does raise
the fundamental issue regarding the nature of the property bought
and the purpose of the depletion deduction. Has the taxpayer pur-
chased a water right measured by the zone of saturation? Or has
he purchased a water right measured by his needs and the produc-
tive period of the basin? Legally, the taxpayer has a right measured
by the former under the absolute ownership because he is free to
withdraw as much as he needs even to the extent of exhausting the
area of saturation underlying the land of others. But practically,
a taxpayer will pay a price measured in part by his actual need and
the period of productivity of the basin. If his water right is meas-
ured by the zone of saturation, should the taxpayer be permitted a
depletion or a loss deduction when the decline under his land is
caused by others?2 7 These questions are not merely matters of
26. It is arguable, of course, that the cost basis applies only to anticipated total
withdrawal.
27. Depletion deduction has been described as follows:
The depletion effected by production is likened to the depreciation of
machinery or the using up of raw materials in manufacturing. . . . The deduc-
tion is therefore permitted as an act of grace and is intended as compensation
for the capital assets consumed in the production of income through the sever-
ance of the minerals.
Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 408 (1940).
It should be noted that actual use of property is not necessary for a depreciation
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academic interest, for the timing and the amount of deduction might
depend upon their resolution.
Another problem arising from Shurbet is the significance to be
attached to the determination of the court that the taxpayer, under
Texas law, "owns the soil and the percolating water which is part
of the soil."'28 Does the applicability of the Shurbet case depend upon
whether a particular state determines the overlying owner to "own"
the percolating ground water or defines his right to be usufruc-
tuary? 2' An examination of the Governmen't contention in this re-
gard should place the court's observation in the proper perspective.
The Government argued that the taxpayer had not established that
he had an "ownership or investment interest in a specific mineral
deposit."30 In other words, the Government was making the argu-
deduction. A depreciable property which has been devoted to a trade or business,
although not actually used, is subject to a depreciation allowance. Compare P.
Dougherty Co. v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1946) ; cert. denied, 331 U.S. 838
(1947) ; Kittredge v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 632 (2d Cir. 1937), 'with Nulex, Inc., 30
T.C. 769 (1958). The analogy, however, is imperfect since the decline in the water
table is caused by activities of others. It would seem that the taxpayer should be able
to take a loss under § 165, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, even if the taxpayer has not with-
drawn any water and yet there is a decline. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.165-6(d) (2)
(1960). A case such as Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. v. Commissioner, 161 F.2d 842
(5th Cir. 1947), which denied to a purchaser of the fee a loss deduction for worthless-
ness of a mineral interest, is distinguishable because the condition of the land was not
altered in any manner and the taxpayer was merely frustrated in his expectations.
More troublesome is a case such as Pugh v. Commissioner, 49 F.2d 76 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 642 (1931), where loss was denied for injury to agricultural capacity
of land through impregnation of oil and salt water. But if the right to water is a
separable item of property, as must be assumed, then the loss of units of water subject
to the right is like the destruction of trees for which a loss deduction is allowed. I.T.
3921, 1948-2 Cum. Bull. 32.
On the other hand, when a decline in the water table is the result of extraction by
the taxpayer and others, a depletion allowance for the decline, regardless of the cause,
can be justified by an analogy to loss in inventory. See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-6(f) (2)
(1960).
In fact, for ease of administration it would appear proper to permit depletion allow-
ance rather than a loss under all circumstances. The tax consequence might be the
same under either deduction. Although a loss deduction will ordinarily be determined
by the difference in the market value before and after the loss but not exceeding the
adjusted basis of the property, Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(a) (2) (1960) ; Alcoma Ass'n,
Inc. v. United States, 239 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1956), the taxpayer has assigned a unit
basis to the percolating ground water so that the deductible loss would be no greater
than the cost depletion allowance.
28. 347 F.2d at 106.
29. See 2 Wiel, Water Rights in the Western United States 1041 (3d ed. 1911)
(characterizing the California correlative rights as unsufructuary). The appropriative
right and even the reasonable use theory would appear inconsistent with the absolute
ownership theory.
30. Brief for Appellant, pp. 49-50. The taxpayer injected the legal concept of
ownership in reply to the Government's argument. Brief for Appellee, p. 10.
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ment that, because the percolating ground water is moving accord-
ing to the gradient, different molecules of water are constantly
moving to, and away from, the taxpayer's land. It was an argument
based on lack of physical identity rather than legal characterization.
Therefore, although it was unfortunate to talk about legal owner-
ship under the absolute ownership doctrine, it would seem that cost
depletion should be allowable regardless of whether a given state
adopts the absolute ownership, reasonable use, correlative rights or
appropriation system of defining the right to percolating ground
water.
Shurbet also leaves unanswered the issue whether a depletion
allowance will be granted where the water basin is subject to sub-
stantial annual recharge, but is also subjected to overdraft condi-
tions. Where the state law imposes no restriction on the total amount
of withdrawal, it would appear that a depletion allowance should
be granted to the extent that storage water is extracted from the
basin. The proof will have to show that the decline in the water
table is not merely cyclical, but is a permanent condition due to
extraction beyond the average safe annual yield.
In some states, a restriction is imposed on the total amount of
withdrawal. For example, in California the total amount of the
annual withdrawal from a basin which will be permitted without in-
fringement upon any prior right to the ground water is the average
safe annual yield. 1 A person with a superior right can enjoin those
with inferior rights from causing an overdraft. Thus, where there
is a substantial recharge, the persons with a superior right to the
basin water would have an inexhaustible supply. In some other
states, an administrative agency has the authority to restrict the
extraction from the groundwater basin to prevent an overdraft or
its aggravation.3 2
If, however, a prior overdraft condition existed, the decline in
the water table would be a permanent condition even if a balance
between recharge and extraction is restored. When the balance is
restored, the supply becomes inexhaustible; but there still might
31. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 937 (1950).
32. E.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. § 534.110 (1961) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 537.735 (1961) ; Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 41-129 (1957). In states which recognize appropriative right to ground
water, the total amount of extraction might be controlled if the prior appropriator's
means of diversion is to be protected. See, e.g., Current Creek Irrigation Co. v.
Andrews, 9 Utah 2d 324, 344 P.2d 528 (1959). See also City of Colorado Springs v.
Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961).
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exist the adverse consequence of continued increased expenses of
pumping from a lower water table. There might also be an addi-
tional cost of drilling a deeper well. Should the taxpayer be entitled
to a depletion allowance for the lowering of the water table under
these circumstances? Conceptually, it is difficult to think in terms of
depletion allowance when the supply is inexhaustible. It is arguable
that a loss deduction under section 165 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 may be taken for a permanent impairment of the
water right to the extent that the value of the right has decreased
because of future increased pumping costs. 33
While Shurbet may hold tax advantages for many taxpayers,
there may be disadvantages to others. Because the "mining" of
ground water is now determined to be subject to cost depletion, a
taxpayer must adjust the basis of the water right for past depletion
which was allowable, though not actually taken by the taxpayer.3 4 In
other words, Shurbet will operate retroactively to require an ad-
justment to the basis of the property to the extent that cost deple-
tion should have been taken by the taxpayer in the past. The fact that
the taxpayer might have been ignorant of the depletion allowance
appears immaterial under section 1016 (a) (2) .3
Finally, Shurbet raises the question whether a taxpayer who in-
curs "exploration" or "development" expenditures with respect to
a groundwater basin with insignificant natural recharge can take
advantage of sections 615 and 616.6
Section 615 permits a taxpayer to deduct as ordinary expenses the
amounts paid or incurred for the "purpose of ascertaining the exis-
tence, location, extent, or quality of any deposit of ore or other
mineral" before the "beginning of the development stage of the
mine or deposit. ' 37 The limitations upon such deduction are $100,-
000 in any one taxable year,38 and a maximum of $400,000 over any
number of years.39 The taxpayer also has the election of deferring
33. See note 26 supra. The fact that artificial recharge of the basin is possible or
is being undertaken would appear immaterial.
34. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1016(a) (2); cf., Kittredge v. Commissioner 88 F.2d
632 (2d Cir. 1937).
35. Taxpayers should file a refund claim for the period not barred by the statute of
limitations. The period allowed is three years from the time the return was filed or two
years from the time the tax was paid, whichever expires later. Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 6511 (a).
36. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 615, 616.
37. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 615 (a).
38. Ibid.
39. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 615(c) (1).
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the expenditures mentioned above and deducting them on a ratable
basis of units produced when production is achieved. 40 If the tax-
payer chooses neither to deduct the expenditures nor to treat them as
deferred expenses, the expenditures will be capitalized,4' or a loss de-
duction will be allowed if the venture proves to be unsuccessful. 42
The benefit of the election to deduct the exploration expenditures
or to treat them as deferred expenses and deduct them during pro-
duction inures primarily to a taxpayer who is entitled to take a per-
centage depletion allowance because the allowance may be taken
without regard to the basis of the property.4 3 If the benefits of this
section are available to taxpayers who are restricted to cost deple-
tion, an election to defer the expenditures will have an effect different
from capitalizing the expenditures and taking a cost depletion. Thus,
for them, the benefit of section 615 is in the election to deduct the
expenditures at the time they are paid or incurred.
Section 616 gives the taxpayer the same election with respect to
development expenses as with the exploration expenditures. How-
ever, section 616 contains no monetary limitation on the amount
deductible. But if the taxpayer chooses to defer during the develop-
ment stage, the amount which can be deferred is restricted to the
expenditures in excess of the net receipts during the taxable year
from the minerals produced from the deposit for which the expen-
ditures were made.4 4 Development expenditures are those expendi-
tures made after minerals in commercially marketable quantities
have been found.4 5
40. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 615(b). The deferred expenses are included within
the limitations discussed in text accompanying notes 41 & 42 infra.
41. Rev. Rul. 58-358, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 359.
42. I.T. 4006, 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 48. The loss may not be allowed if the taxpayer
either acquires or retains a property based on the data obtained from exploration.
Ibid. However, I.T. 4006 appears to be dealing with mineral property as such and
does not appear to be concerned with the situation where property is retained for
independent reasons, as for example, a farmer who retains his farm land for farming
purposes despite the failure of the exploration to locate ground water.
43. One of the reasons given for the election under the original act is the necessity
for added incentive since the amount of the percentage depletion is not dependent upon
the exploration expenditures. S. Rep. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 737 (1951) ; 1951-2
Cum. Bull. 503.
44. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 616(b).
45. Under both §§ 615 and 616, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, the amount expended for
depreciable items is not currently deductible. The allowance for depreciation is, how-
ever, considered as exploration or development expenditure, as the case may be. Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 615(a), 616(a).
The election to defer the development expense is applicable even during the pro-
ducing stage except that, during the development stage, the development expenses must
be deducted currently and only the excess of the expenses over the net receipts from the
minerals produced from such mine can be deferred. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 616(b).
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The applicability of sections 615 and 616 with respect to ground-
water basins is unclear because section 615 refers to "deposit of
ore or other mineral" and to "mine or deposit," and section 616
alludes to "mine or other natural deposit" and to "ores or minerals."
The court of appeals in Shurbet has characterized ground water as
a "natural deposit. '46 The district court has stated that ground
water was a "mineral and a natural deposit. '47 The regulation de-
fines "minerals" to include nonmetallic deposits.48 From these bits,
an argument favoring the taxpayer can be constructed.49
Another issue which must be faced by the taxpayer to take ad-
vantage of these sections is whether these sections are available to
a taxpayer who does not intend to sell the minerals produced. There
is nothing in sections 615 (a) or 616 (a), which deals with current
deduction, that restricts their application to those intending to mar-
ket the minerals. However, where a taxpayer elects to defer these
expenditures under sections 615(b) or 616(b), the deferred ex-
penditures are deductible on a ratable basis as the minerals are
"sold." Moreover, the provisions relating to development expendi-
tures are applicable after minerals are found in "commercially mar-
ketable quantities." Do these phrases sufficiently color the sections
to restrict their applicability to taxpayers engaged in production for
sale? It appears that the phrase "commercially marketable quan-
tities" was employed to distinguish between the exploration and the
development stage and does not appear to carry any other connota-
tion.50 Furthermore, it can be argued that whatever the meaning
of "sold," its applicability is restricted to deferred expenditures.
Shurbet has established an important principle. However, it is
probably only the first step in the developing tax problems relating
to groundwater mining.
Once the producing stage is reached, the expenses incurred to maintain output are
deductible as a current expense. Clear Fork Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 638
(6th Cir. 1956). The extraordinary development expenditures during the producing
stage are subject to the election under § 616. See S. Rep. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1951), 1951-2 Cum. Bull. 559. The taxpayer need no longer hazard a guess as to
whether the producing stage has been reached in order to obtain a current deduction.
46. 347 F.2d at 108.
47. Finding No. 6.01, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. T 9528.
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1 (d) (5) (1960).
49. It appears that the primary purpose of §§ 615 and 616, Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
was to give added tax advantage to those utilizing percentage depletion, H.R. Rep.
No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), 1951-1 Cum. Bull. 379; S. Rep. No. 781, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), 1951-2 Cum. Bull. 489, 503, but there is nothing in these reports
to indicate that the benefits of these sections are to be restricted to percentage deple-
tion taxpayers.
50. S. Rep. No. 781, supra note 49.
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